Nowadays the data of the industrial Internet of Things (IIOT) have been stored in cloud servers. The security and privacy of stored data have been hot research topics. The technique of public key searchable encryption (PKSE) may contribute to protect the privacy of industrial data. It is extremely significant how to use PKSE to encrypted data and retrieve the encrypted data without revealing users' private information. Meanwhile, most of the existing PKSE schemes do not consider the identity verification of the data owner who may upload bad ciphertext if he is malicious. In this paper, we firstly analyze the security of a certificateless searchable encryption scheme in the IIOT environment (Ma et al. scheme), and propose a feasible attack to demonstrate that their scheme is not secure. Through this attack, Type I adversary A I can forge the trapdoor value for all keywords. Then we proposed a verifiable certificateless public key searchable encryption (VCLPKSE) scheme. The scheme not only overcomes the security issue of Ma et al. scheme, but also offers the authentications of data owners and data users. Via the authentication mechanism, data owners could not repudiate the fact they uploaded the ciphertext. Finally, we proved that the VCLPKSE scheme satisfies the ciphertext indistinguishability, trapdoor indistinguishability and unforgeability in the random oracle model. Meanwhile, we also do the simulation experiment to demonstrate the scheme's efficiency.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IOT) collects and exchanges information through wireless sensors, actuators and smart devices. Nowadays, the IOT is widely used for industrial environment. With the development of cloud computing technology, the data of the Industrial Internet of Things (IIOT) is outsourced to cloud servers increasingly, which can reduce the costs of data management and promote the data sharing. The issues of confidentiality and privacy should be considered while industrial data is outsourced to the cloud server as it may be malicious [1] . For example, the data may be tampered, deleted or corrupted by internal staff of the cloud server, which may destroy data's integrity and reliability. Encryption technique may contribute to protect the privacy The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Qammer Hussain Abbasi . of industrial data. The owner or equipment can encrypt the data of IIOT and then upload the ciphertext to cloud servers. However, when data users want to use those data, they should download all the ciphertext firstly and then decrypt them before retrieving. It requires abundant costs of calculation and storage. To overcome this deficiency, the technology of encryption with keyword search has been introduced [2] .
The searchable encryption (SE) mechanism requires the data owner to encrypt the keywords related to data and upload to the untrusted cloud server with ciphertext in order to facilitate the retrieval of the ciphertext corresponding to these keywords. If authorized users want to retrieve the data, they should generate and send the trapdoor information corresponding to the keyword to the cloud server. The cloud server retrieves the ciphertext via the trapdoor information. If the server's retrieval is successful, the corresponding data will be sent to the user. The SE is split into symmetric searchable VOLUME 8, 2020 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ encryption (SSE) and public key searchable encryption (PKSE). In 2000, Song et al. [2] firstly proposed the concept of SSE, in which the user has to negotiate a shared key with the sender before retrieving the encrypted data. However, SSE is rather inconvenient because the key distribution is difficult.
To solve this weakness, Boneh et al. [3] proposed the concept of PKSE. The PKSE would be more convenient that SSE, as it does not need key agreement between data owner and data users. Then PEKS is more suitable for multi-user data sharing application. Normally we think the data owner of PKSE is honest and trusted, but it was not truth in the actual PKSE of IIOT environment. It may cause immeasurable losses to the enterprise, if the data owner tampered and then uploaded malicious data gathered by the sensors to the cloud server. So we propose a verifiable certificateless public key searchable encryption (VCLPKSE) scheme. In the VCLPKSE scheme, the data owner added the signature operation before uploading data, and the signature is included in each uploaded data. Once malicious data are recognized, the data user can immediately feed back to the cloud server who can confirm the supplier of malicious data via that signature information.
The framework of the VCLPKSE scheme for IIOT is shown in Figure 1 . In the IIOT the wireless sensor collects industrial production data, equipment operating status and other information, and then sends them to the data uploader. Data owner extracts keywords from the data offered by the data uploader, encrypts extracted keywords and executes the signature operation. Then the data owner sends the signature and the ciphertext together to the cloud server for storage. When a user authorized by the data owner wants to get the data with a specified keyword, he/she should generate a trapdoor associated with that specified keyword and sent them to cloud server. After receiving the credential cloud server can complete the search process, then feedback the result to the users.
In 2018, Ma et al. [4] proposed a certificateless public key searchable encryption (CLPKSE) scheme, which is the first CLPKSE application in IIoT environment that provides higher security. From the way it is described, Ma et al.'s scheme satisfies the ciphertext indistinguishability without the secure channel in random oracle model. Unfortunately Wu et al. [5] indicated that Ma et al's scheme is insecure against an off-line keyword guessing attack (KGA) recently. In general, we should consider the security properties of both ciphertext indistinguishability and trapdoor indistinguishability for PKSE schemes. However, Ma et al's scheme does not satisfy the second security property.
A. OUR CONTRIBUTIONS
The main contributions of this paper are the following:
• Firstly, via security analysis, we demonstrate that Ma et al's scheme does not meet the trapdoor indistinguishability under the adaptive selection keyword attack.
• Secondly, we propose a VCLPKSE scheme which can overcome the security weakness of the Ma et al's scheme and offer the authentications of data owners and data users. Via the authentication mechanism, the data user can show that the data owner supplies malicious data.
• Finally, we proved that the VCLPKSE scheme satisfies the ciphertext indistinguishability, trapdoor indistinguishability and unforgeability for data owner in the random oracle model.
B. RELATED WORK
SE can perform a specific search for ciphertext data stored in the cloud [2] , which can realize the confidentiality of data stored in the cloud server and retrieve the encrypted data efficiently. In 2003, in order to describe the attack model and security objectives better, Goh [6] proposed an indistinguishability security model under the keyword attack. In 2012, Curtmola et al. [7] proposed a security model with trapdoor indistinguishability. Cloud server may return incorrect or partial search results, as it may be selfish or curious. So to resist semi-trusted and curious server attacks, Chai et al. [8] proposed a verifiable symmetric searchable encryption scheme, in which the server not only returns the search results, but also returns the corresponding evidence to users. Then users can verify the integrity of the ciphertext returned from the server. Due to the widespread use of cloud storage the SE scheme of the single data user model no longer meets the current application service. Therefore, Curtmola et al. [7] firstly proposed SE scheme for multiple users. Then multi-users SE schemes have been enhanced [9] - [13] . The security channel is required to transmit the trapdoor values between the user and the server in the PKSE schemes. To overcome this unrealistic requirement in the real IIOT, Baek et al. [14] and Lu et al. [15] respectively proposed SE schemes which satisfy the public channel and allow keyword ciphertexts and search trapdoors to be transmitted in an open channel. Based on the different public key cryptographies, researchers studied identitybased PKSE [16] , [17] , attribute-based PKSE [18] - [20] and certificateless PKSE [4] , [5] , [21] - [28] . The design and implementation of certificateless PKSE are more useful than traditional PKSE and identity-based PKSE as it can solve certificates management of traditional public key cryptography and key escrow problems of identity-based public key cryptography. Nowadays, applying CLPKSE to the actual environment has become a hot research, Benedikt and Michel [30] proposed a Dynamic searchable symmetric encryption for storing geospatial data in the cloud. Some SE schemes has been used in the environments of IOT.
Recently, Zhou et al. [29] proposed a file-centric searchable encryption scheme for IIOT.
C. PAPER ORGANIZATION
In section 2 we simply describe Ma's scheme and its cryptanalysis. We show our new scheme in section 3 and give the security model in section 4. In section 5 and section 6, the security proof and performance analysis will be described. Finally, the conclusion will be shown in section 7.
II. MA'S SCHEME AND CRYPTANALYSIS
A. MA'SCHEME
We simply describe Ma's scheme [4] as follows:
• Setup: Taking a security parameter k as input, KGC picks up two cyclic groups G 1 , G 2 with same order q, and a bilinear pairing e : 
• Set-Secret-Value: The server randomly chooses x IDS ∈ Z * q as its secret value. The data owner randomly chooses x IDO ∈ Z * q as its secret value. The data user randomly chooses x IDR ∈ Z * q as its secret value. • Set-Private-Key: The private key of the server is Sk IDS = (x IDS , D IDS ). The private key of the data owner is Sk IDO = (x IDO , D IDO ). The private key of the data user is Sk IDR = (x IDR , D IDR ).
• Set-Public-Key: The cloud sever inputs prms, and secret value x IDR , and computes Pk IDS = x IDS P as it's public key. The data owner inputs prms and secret value x IDO , and computes Pk IDO = x IDO P as it's public key. The data user inputs prms and secret value x IDS , and computes Pk IDR = x IDR P as it's public key.
• Encryption: Let W = {w i |1 ≤ i ≤ n} be a set of keywords. The data owner takes prms, the identity ID S and public key of cloud sever, identity ID R and public key Pk IDR of data user as input and performs the following steps to encrypt the keyword w i ∈ W .
3) The final ciphertext for keyword is C =
• Trapdoor: Data user inputs private key Sk IDR and computes trapdoor T w = x IDR H 2 (w) + D IDR .
• Test:The cloud sever inputs his private key Sk IDS , trapdoor T w and ciphertext C. If the equation
There are two adversaries in the certificateless public cryptographic. Type I adversary A I cannot obtain the system master key but can replace user's public key using his choice. Type I I adversary A II acts malicious KGC who can get the system master key but cannot allow to replace the public key of the user. The trapdoor value of the Ma scheme mainly depends on the secret value x IDR and partial private key D IDR of the data user. According to our analysis, A I can realize the following process to succeed in obtaining the user's partial private key if trapdoor query is not forbidden Then A I knows user's complete private key and can run any operation including forging the trapdoor of the arbitrary keywords w i .
• Replace the public key of the data user: A I randomly chooses x IDR ∈ Z * q firstly, sets new public key as the value Pk IDR = x IDR P. Then A I runs ''replace public key query''.
• Query: A I sequentially submits trapdoor query of keyword w l and obtains T wl = x IDR H 2 (w l ) + D IDR .
• Get partial private key: A I can compute user's partial private key 
III. VCLPKES SCHEME FOR IIOT
In this section, we propose a VCLPKES scheme for IIOT and give the correctness and security.
A. CONSTRUCTION OF VCLPKES SCHEME Wireless sensors are important parts of the IIOT and are responsible for collecting industrial production data as well as equipment information. A wireless sensor network is composed of a large number of wireless sensor nodes and a plurality of the base stations (BS). Acting as a gateway between the sensor nodes and the cloud server (CS), the BS usually used to forward data from the IIOT to the CS. This communication from the BS to the server should satisfy the confidentiality and integrity of the uploaded data, and the identity verification and non-repudiation of the BS. Confidentiality guarantees that adversary does not intercept the data, and the integrity ensures that adversary does not modify the uploaded data. If the identity of the BS is verified, the authenticity of the uploaded data should be guaranteed. Meanwhile the non-repudiation ensures The BS does not deny the uploaded data. Figure 2 shows a system application diagram of the solution applied to the IIOT. The system model mainly includes four entities: BS, CS, user and service provider (SP) acting as KGC in the IIOT model. The scheme envisages the following algorithms.
• Setup: Taking a security parameter k as input, SP picks up two cyclic groups G 1 and G 2 with same order q, where G 1 is a cycle addition group and G 2 is a cycle multiplication group. SP picks up a bilinear pairing e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 and performs the following steps: Selects a generator P of G 1 and chooses a random number s ∈ Z * q as the master key, compute P pub = sP. Select five hash functions:
• Extract-Partial-Private-Key: SP performs the following steps to generate partial private key of the CS, data user and BS. 1) Input the identity of the CS ID S ∈ {0, 1} * ,
. SP sent the partial private keys to the CS, the BS and the data user respectively. • Set-Public-Key: The CS inputs the prms and secret value x S , computes the public key Pk S = x S P. The data user inputs the prms and secret value x R , computes the public key Pk R = x R P. The BS inputs the prms and secret value x D , computes the public key Pk D = x D P.
• Encryption: Wireless sensor networks collect industrial production data and operation status of the equipment, and then send the data to the BS. The BS extracts and encrypts keywords, and encrypts the data using AES encryption algorithm. The ciphertext is packaged and sent to the CS. In order to prevent the BS from being malicious, the encryption algorithm should include information of the signature signed by the BS. Once the CS finds the uploaded data had been tampered, he can immediately determine which BS is inaccurate. Let W = {w i |1 ≤ i ≤ n} be a set of keywords. The BS inputs its private key Sk D , system parameter prms, identity ID S and public key Pk S of the CS, identity ID R and public key Pk R of the data user, and performs the following steps to encrypt the
• Trapdoor: Data user inputs prms, private key Sk R and the identity ID R of data user to generate trapdoor for sending to the CS. Since data user generated the trapdoor by using its own private key, the search trapdoor is equivalent to a signature of the data user.
• Test: Upon receiving the search trapdoor T w , the CS inputs its private key Sk S , system parameters prms and ciphertext (C i , S i ) to perform the following steps: 1) Firstly verify the trapdoor. If the equation
= v i held, it returns the corresponding ciphertext to the data user, otherwise outputs ''0''. 2) Then check e(S i , P) = e(Q D , P pub )e(W i α i + Pk D , H 5 (w i )). If it held, the BS is verified; Otherwise, the CS rejects the BS to upload ciphertext to the CS. This is to verify whether the identity of the BS is legal, and prevent malicious BS from uploading data.
B. CORRECTNESS ANALYSIS
• Keyword consistency verification for keywords after uploaded trapdoor.
• Verify the identity of the BS: • Extract-Partial-Private-Key query: Given the identity ID i , C calculates the corresponding partial private key D i to A I .
• Public-Key query: Given the identity ID i , C calculates the corresponding public key Pk i to the A I .
• Replace-Public-Key query: A I can replace the public key using his choice.
• Extract-Private-Key query: Given the identity ID i , C calculates the corresponding private key Sk i to the A I .
• Trapdoor query: Given the keyword w i with identity ID i , C calculates the corresponding trapdoor T w = (T 1 , T 2 ) to A I .
• Challenges: A I chooses keywords (w 0 , w 1 ) and identity ID * which expected to challenge, C randomly chooses b ∈ {0, 1}, and runs Encryption algorithm to calculate ciphertext C b to A I . A I can issue the polynomial query like Phase 1, but cannot make a Trapdoor query with w i = (w 0 , w 1 ).
• Guess: A I outputs b ∈ {0, 1}. Game 2: The interaction between the adversary A II and the challenger C is as follows.
• Setup: C runs Setup algorithm to output system parameter and master key s. Phase 1: A II can adaptively issue Hash query, Public-Key query, Private-Key query and Trapdoor query.
• Challenges: A II chooses keywords (w 0 , w 1 ) and identity ID * to challenge, C randomly choose b ∈ {0, 1}, and runs Encryption algorithm to calculate ciphertext C b to A II . Phase 2: A II can issue the polynomial query like Phase 1, but cannot make a Trapdoor query with w i = (w 0 , w 1 ).
B. TRAPDOOR INDISTINGUISHABILITY Theroem 2: If A I and A II can win Game 3 and Game 4 with a non-negligible advantage respectively, we can say that the scheme is satified with the trapdoor indistinguishable under the adaptive chosen keyword attack.
Game 3: The interaction between the A I and the challenger C is as follows.
• Setup: C outputs the system parameters by running the Setup algorithm, where C does not know the master key s. Phase 1: A I can adaptively issue query as follow:
• Hash query: A I can query the hash algorithm and get the corresponding answer.
• Extract-Partial-Private-Key query: Given the identity ID i , C calculates the corresponding partial private key D i to the A I .
• Encryption query: Given the keyword w i with identity ID i , C calculates the corresponding ciphertext
• Challenges: A I chooses keywords (w 0 , w 1 ) and challenge identity ID * to challenge, C randomly selects b ∈ {0, 1}, and returns trapdoor search toking (T 1 , T 2 ) to A I by running Trapdoor algorithm. Phase 2: A I can issue the polynomial query like Phase 1, but cannot make CLC-PEKS query with w i = (w 0 , w 1 ).
• Guess: A I outputs b ∈ {0, 1}. Game 4: The interaction between A II and the challenger C is as follows.
• Setup: C outputs the system parameters and the master key s by running the Setup algorithm. Phase 1: A II can adaptively issue Hash query, Public-Key query, Private-Key query and Encryption query.
• Challenges: A II choose keywords (w 0 , w 1 ) and identity ID * to challenge, C randomly selects b ∈ {0, 1}, and returns Trapdoor search toking (T 1 , T 2 ) by running Trapdoor algorithm to A II . Phase 2: A II can issue the polynomial query like Phase 1, but cannot make Encryption query with w i = (w 0 , w 1 ).
• Guess: A II outputs b ∈ {0, 1}.
C. UNFORGEABILITY
Theroem 3: If A I and A II can win Game 5 and Game 6 with a non-negligible advantage respectively, we can say that the scheme is satisfied with the unforgeability under the adaptive chosen ciphertext attack.
Game 5: The interaction between the adversary and challenger C is as follows.
• Extract-Partial-Private-Key query: A I given the identity ID i , C calculates the corresponding partial private key D i to the A I .
• Set-value query: A I given the identity ID i , C calculates the corresponding public key Pk i to the A I .
• Replace-Public-Key query: A I can replace the public key of any user.
• Sign query: Given the keyword w i and identity ID i , then C calculates the signature (W i , S i ) to A I .
• Forge: A I forged the signature of the keyword W * with identity ID * . Game 6: The interaction between the adversary A II and challenger C is as follows:
• Setup: C outputs system parameter and system master key s by running Setup algorithm. Phase 1: A II can adaptively issue Hash query, Public-Key query and Sign query.
• Forge: A II forged the signature of the keyword W * with identity ID * .
V. PROVABLE SECURITY A. KEYWORD CIPHERTEXT INDISTINGUISHABLE
In this section, we will show that our scheme is satisfied with the keyword ciphertext indistinguishable under adaptive chosen keyword attack and non-repudiation under adaptive chosen message attack. Theorem1 is proved on the following two lemmas. Lemma 1: If the BDH problem is difficult, the proposed scheme will resist the attack of the adversary A I and satisfy the keyword ciphertext indistinguishable of the under the adaptive chosen keyword attack.
Proof: C inputs a BDH problem instance of (P,aP,bP,cP), the goal is to challenge A I to compute e(P, P) abc .
• Setup: C performs Setup algorithm, sets P pub = aP, and returns system parameters prms = {k, G 1 , G 2 , q, P, P pub , H 1 , H 2 , H 3 , H 4 , H 5 } to A I . C randomly chooses ID I as a challenge identity. To respond hash queries, partial-private-key query, secret value query and public key query from A I , C maintains six lists L H −1 ,
• H 1 query: When the identity ID i is submitted for the query. If ID i is already in a (ID i , α i , Q i ) in L H −1 , then C returns Q i . If ID i = ID I , C chooses a random number α i ∈ Z * q , computes Q i = α i bP. Otherwise, picks a random number α i ∈ Z * q , and computes Q i = α i P. Adds (ID i , α i , Q i ) to list L H −1 and outputs Q i to A I . • H 4 query: When A I asks a H 4 query about (α i , ID S , ID R , Pk R , w i ), C checks L H −4 . If α i is already in a tuple (α i , ID S , ID R , Pk R , w i ) in L H −4 , then C outputs α i . Otherwise, chooses a random number α i ∈ Z * q , returns α i to A I . and adds (α i , ID S , ID R , Pk R , w i ) to list L H −4 .
• H 2 query: When
• H 5 query: When A I asks a H 5 query about (γ i , ID R ), C checks L H −5 . If γ i is already in a tuple (γ i , ID R ) in L H −5 , then C outputs γ i . Otherwise, chooses a random number γ i ∈ G 1 , returns γ i to A I . and adds (γ i , ID R ) to list L H −5 .
• Extract-Partial-Private-Key query: When A I asks for the Partial-Private-Key of ID i , C performs H 1 query and obtains (ID i , α i , Q i ). If ID i = ID I , then computes D i = α i P pub = α i aP, adds (ID i , Q i , D i ) to list L D and returns D i to A I . Otherwise, C aborts.
• Public-Key query: When A I asks for the public-key query of identity ID i , C firstly checks list L Pk . If Pk i is already exists in a tuple (ID i , x i , Pk i ) in L Pk , then C returns Pk i to A I . Otherwise, C chooses a random number x i ∈ Z * q , and computes Pk i = x i P. Adds (ID i , x i , Pk i ) to list L Pk and returns Pk i to A I .
• Replace-Public-Key query: A I . can replace any user's public key with a random value.
• Extract-Private-Key query: Take identity ID i as input. If ID i = ID I , then C aborts. If (ID i , Q i , D i ) and (ID i , x i , Pk i ) exits in L D and L Pk , respectively, then C set Sk i = (x i , D i ) and sends it to A I . Otherwise, performs a Public-key query and a Extract-Partial-Private-Key query with ID i , simulating the above process to obtain Sk i = (x i , D i ) and sends it to A I .
• Trapdoor query: When A I asks C aborts. Otherwise, C recovers trapdoor query on keyword w i of ID i , if ID i = ID I , (ID i , Q i , D i ) and (ID i , x i , Pk i ) from L D and L Pk , recovers (α i , ID S , ID R , Pk R , w i ) and (H 5 (ID R ), ID R ) from L H −4 and L H −5 . C chooses a random number f i ∈ Z * q and computes T 1 = f i P and
. Then Creturns the trapdoor T w = (T 1 , T 2 ) of the keyword w i to A I .
• Challenge: A I will issue a challenge on two different keywords w 0 and w 1 with identity ID * . If ID * = ID I , then C aborts. Otherwise, chooses b ∈ {0, 1} randomly.
as the challenge ciphertext to A I .
• More Trapdoor query: A I can perform additional trapdoor query on keyword w i , where w i = w 0 and w i = w 1 . C responds as above.
• Guess: Finally, A I outputs b ∈ {0, 1} as its guess. Lemma 2: If the BDH problem is difficult, the scheme will resist the attack of the adversary A II and satisfy the indistinguishable of the keyword ciphertext under the adaptively chosen keyword attack.
Proof: C inputs an CDH problem instance of (P, aP, bP), the goal is to use A II compute abP.
• Setup: C generates the system master key s ∈ Z * q , sets P pub = sP, then returns system parameters prms = {k, G 1 , G 2 , q, P, P pub , q, P, P pub , H 1 , H 2 , H 3 , H 4 , H 5 } to A II , C chooses ID I as a challenge identity. To respond hash queries, partial-private-key query, secret value query and public key query from A II , C maintains six empty-initial lists L H −1 , L H −2 , L H −3 , L H −4 , L H −5 , L D , L x , L Pk to answer. Note that A II answers to H 2 , H 4 , and H 5 queries are the same as those in Lemma 1.
• H 1 query: When the identity ID i is submitted for the query. If ID i is already in a (ID i , α i , Q i ) in L H −1 , then C returns Q i . Otherwise, Crandomly chooses Q i ∈ G 1 , sends it to A II and adds (ID i , Q i ) to list L H −1 .
• H 3 query: On input (W , ID, Pk ID , Q, g 1 , g 2 ), if e(aP, bP) = Q, C returns Q as the solution for the instance of the CDH problem and stop. Otherwise, if e(W , Pk ID ) = e(Q, P) and e(U , H 1 (ID)) s = g 1 , C goes through the list L H −3 with entries (W , ID, Pk ID , Q, g 1 , g 2 , h) for different values h of and returns h if such a tuple exists. Otherwise, it returns a random value h and updates the list L H −3 with a tuple containing the input and h.
• Public-key query: Once receiving a public-key query with ID i , C firstly checks list L Pk . If (ID i , x i , Pk i ) exists in L Pk , C returns Pk i to A II . Otherwise, C chooses a random number x i ∈ Z * q . If ID i = ID I , computes Pk i = x i bP. Otherwise, Pk i = x i P. Adds (ID i , x i , Pk i ) into list L Pk and outputs Pk i to A II .
• Private-Key query: Once receiving a private-key query about identity ID i . If ID i = ID I , C aborts. Otherwise, C checks list L Pk . If (ID i , x i , Pk i ) exists in L Pk , C gets (ID i , Q i ) from list L Pk , computes Sk i = (x i , sQ i , ) and sends to A II .
• Trapdoor query: When A II asks trapdoor query on keyword w i of ID i , if ID i = ID I , C aborts. Otherwise, C recovers (ID i , Q i , D i ) and (ID i , x i , Pk i ) from L D and L Pk , recovers (α i , ID S , ID R , Pk R , w i ) and (H 5 (ID R ), ID R ) from L H −4 and L H −5 . C chooses a random number f i ∈ Z * q and computes T 1 = f i P and
Then C returns the trapdoor T w = (T 1 , T 2 ) of the keyword w i to A II .
• Challenge: A II will make challenge on two different keywords w 0 and w 1 with identity ID * . If ID * = ID I , then C aborts. Otherwise, chooses b ∈ {0, 1} randomly.
• More Trapdoor query: A II can perform additional trapdoor query on keyword w i , where w i = w 0 and w i = w 1 . C responds as above.
• Guess: Finally, A II outputs b ∈ {0, 1} as its guess.
B. TRAPDOOR INDISTINGUISHABLE
In this section, we will show that our scheme is satisfies with trapdoor indistinguishable under adaptive chosen keyword attack and non-repudiation under adaptive chosen message attack. Theorem 2: In random oracle model, if the adversary A I and A II win the indistinguishable game respectively with a non-negligible advantage, then there will exist a challenger C who can solve the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) problem and Computational-Diffie-Hellman (CDH) with a nonnegligible probability.
Theorem 2 will be proved on the basis of the following two lemmas.
Lemma 3: If the BDH problem is difficult, the proposed scheme will resist the attack of the adversary A I and satisfy the indistinguishable of the trapdoor under the adaptive chosen keyword attack.
Proof: C inputs an instance of BDH problem (P, aP, bP, cP), the goal is to challenge A I to compute e(P, P) abc .
• Setup: C performs Setup algorithm, sets P pub = aP, and returns system parameters prms = {k, G 1 , G 2 , q, P, P pub , • H 1 query: When the identity ID i is submitted for the query. If ID i is already in a (ID i , α i , Q i ) in L H −1 , then C returns Q i . If ID i = ID I , C randomly chooses α i ∈ Z * q , computes Q i = α i bP and sends it to A I ; Otherwise, he computes Q i = α i P to A I and adds (ID i , α i , Q i ) to list L H −1 .
• H 2 query: When A I asks a H 2 query on w i , C checks
• H 3 query: On input (W , ID, Pk ID , Q, g 1 , g 2 ), C goes through the list L H −3 with entries (W , ID, Pk ID , Q, g 1 , 
Otherwise, chooses a random number α i ∈ Z * q , returns α i to A I . and adds (α i , ID S , ID R , Pk R , w i ) to list L H −4 .
• Extract-Partial-Private-Key query: When A I asks for the Partial-Private-Key of ID i , C performs H 1 query and obtains (ID i , α i , Q i ). If ID i = ID I , then computes D i = α i aP, adds (ID i , Q i , D i ) to list L D and returns D i to A I .
• Public-key q uery: When A I asks for the public-key query of identity ID i , C firstly checks list L Pk . If Pk i is already exists in a tuple (ID i , x i , Pk i ) in L Pk , then C returns Pk i to A I. . Otherwise, C chooses a random number x i ∈ Z * q , and computes Pk i = x i P. Adds (ID i , x i , Pk i ) to list L Pk and returns Pk i to A I .
• Replace-Public-Key query: A I. can replace any user's public key with a random value.
• Encryption query: A I. submits an encryption query on the keyword w i with ID i , if ID i = ID I , C aborts. Otherwise, C randomly chooses r i ∈ Z * q and computes W i = r i P and U i = r i H 5 (ID R ), T i = e(r i H 2 (w i ), Pk R + PK S )e(r i (Q R + Q S ), P pub ), and v i = h 3 (T i ),
Then C returns the ciphertext C = {C 1 , C 2 , · · · , C n } of the keyword w i to A I .
• Challenge: Afterphase1, A I equips with ID * to outputs two different challenge keywords w 0 and w 1 . If ID * = ID I , C aborts; Otherwise, C sets T * 1 = cP and T * 2 = sP pub +x R Pk R +α i f i γ i P and returns T * w = (T * 1 , T * 2 ) as the challenge trapdoor to A I .
• More Encryption query: A I performs polynomial bounded adaptive queries, but he doesn't ask for Encryption on keywords w 0 and w 1 .
• Guess: Finally, A I outputs b ∈ {0, 1} as its guess.
Lemma 4:
If the CDH problem is difficult, the scheme will resist the attack of the adversary A II and satisfy the indistinguishable of the trapdoor under the adaptively chosen keyword attack.
Proof: C inputs an instance of CDH problem (P, aP, bP) , the goal is to use A II compute abP.
• Setup: C generates the system master key s ∈ Z * q , sets P pub = sP, then returns system parameters prms = {k, G 1 , G 2 , q, P, P pub , H 1 , H 2 , H 3 , H 4 , H 5 } to A II , C randomly chooses ID I as a challenge identity. To respond hash queries, partial-private-key query, secret value query and public key query from A II , C maintains six empty-initial lists
L Pk to answer.
• H 1 query: When the identity ID i is submitted for the query. If ID i is already in a (ID i , α i , Q i ) in L H −1 , then C returns Q i . Otherwise, C randomly chooses Q i ∈ G 1 , sends it to A II and adds (ID i , Q i ) to list L H −1 .
• H 2 query: When A II asks a H 2 query on
• H 3 query: On input (W , ID, Pk ID , Q, g 1 , g 2 ), C goes through the list L H −3 with entries (W , ID, Pk ID , Q, g 1 , g 2 , h) for different values h of and returns h if such a tuple exists. Otherwise, if e(W , Pk ID ) = e(Q, P) and e(W , H 1 (ID)) s = g 1 , C returns a random value h and updates the list L H −3 with a tuple containing the input and h.
• H 4 query: When A II asks a H 4 query about
Otherwise, chooses a random number α i ∈ Z * q , returns α i to A II and adds (α i , ID S , ID R , Pk R , w i ) to list L H −4 .
• H 5 query: When A II asks a H 5 query about (γ i , ID R ), C checks L H −5 . If γ i is already in a tuple (γ i , ID R ) in L H −5 , then C outputs γ i . Otherwise, chooses a random number γ i ∈ G 1 , returns γ i to A II and adds (γ i , ID R ) to list L H −5 .
• Public-key query: Once receiving a public-key query with ID i , C firstly checks list L Pk . If (ID i , x i , Pk i ) is exists in L Pk , C returns Pk i to A II . Otherwise, C randomly chooses x i ∈ Z * q . If ID i = ID I , computes Pk i = x i bP; if ID i = ID I , adds (ID i , x i , Pk i ) to list L Pk and returns Pk i = x i P to A II .
• Private-Key query: Once receiving a private-key query about identity ID i . If ID i = ID I , C aborts. Otherwise, C checks list L Pk . If (ID i , x i , Pk i ) is exists in L Pk , C gets (ID i , Q i ) from list L Pk , computes Sk i = (x i , sQ i , ) and sends to A II .
• Encryption query: When A II makes a encryption query on the keyword w i with ID i , if ID i = ID I C aborts; Otherwise, C randomly chooses r i ∈ Z * q , computes W i = r i P and U i = r i H 5 (ID R ), T i = e(r i H 2 (w i ), Pk R + PK S )e(r i (Q R + Q S ), P pub ), and v i = h 3 (T i ),
C returns the ciphertext C = {C 1 , C 2 , · · · , C n } of the keyword w i to A II .
• Challenge: Afterphase1, A II equips with ID * to output two different challenge keywords w 0 and w 1 . If ID * = ID I , C aborts; Otherwise, C sets T * 1 = bP and T * 2 = sP pub + x R Pk R + α i f i γ i P and returns T * w = (T * 1 , T * 2 ) as the challenge trapdoor to A II .
• Phase2: A II performs polynomial bounded adaptive queries, but he doesn't ask for Encryption on keywords w 0 and w 1 .
C. UNFORGEABLITY
Theorem 3: Our scheme is unforgeable against a type I adversary A I in the random oracle model assuming the CDH problem is hard. Proof: C inputs an instance (P, aP, bP) of CDH problem, the goal is to compute abP.
• Setup: C performs Setup algorithm, sets P pub = aP, then returns system parameters prms = {k, G 1 , G 2 q, P, P pub , H 1 , H 2 , H 3 , H 4 , H 5 } to A I . C randomly chooses ID I as a challenge identity. To respond hash queries, partial-private-key query, secret value query and public key query from A I , C maintains eight empty-initial lists
• H 1 query: When the identity ID i is submitted for the query. If ID i is already in a (ID i , ϑ i , Q i ) in L H −1 , then C returns Q i . If ID i = ID I , C randomly chooses ϑ i ∈ Z * q , computes Q i = ϑ i bP and sends it to A I ; Otherwise, compute Q i = ϑ i P to A I and adds (ID i , ϑ i , Q i ) to list L H −1 .
• H 2 query: When A I asks a H 2 query on w i , C checks 
If not, C randomly chooses x i ∈ Z * q , adds (ID i , x i ) to list L x and returns x i to A I . 
Therefore, C successfully solved the CDH problem, which contradicts the CDH difficult problem assumption. Theorem 4: Our scheme is unforgeable against a type II adversary A II in the random oracle model assuming the CDH problem is intractable.
Proof: C input an instance CDH problem (P, aP, bP), the goal is to use A II compute abP.
• Setup: C generates the system master key s ∈ Z * q , sets P pub = sP, then returns system parameters prms = {k, G 1 , G 2 , q, P, P pub , H 1 , H 2 , H 3 , H 4 , H 5 } to A II , C randomly chooses ID I as a challenge identity. To respond hash queries, secret value query and public key query from A II , C maintains eight empty-initial lists • Public-Key query: Once receiving a public-key query with ID i , C checks L Pk , if (ID i , x i , Pk i ) exists in L Pk , C return Pk i to A II . Otherwise, he randomly chooses x i ∈ Z * q . if ID i = ID I , C computes Pk i = x i bP. Otherwise he computes Pk i = x i P and returns it to A II , and adds (ID i , x i , Pk i ) to list L Pk .
• Sign query: When A II makes a sign query on the keyword w i with ID i , C checks L H −1 . If ID i = ID I , C aborts; Otherwise, C continues to checks L H −4 and L H −5 , obtain α i and T .C randomly chooses r i ∈ Z * q , computes U i = r i P ∈ G 1 and S i = sQ i + +vα i U i a + vx i aP, returns (U i , S i ) to A II .
• Forge: Finally, the A II outputs the signature S * i of the keyword W * about the identity of ID * . The forged signature must satisfy the verification equation:
Therefore, C successfully solved the CDH problem, which contradicts the CDH difficult problem assumptions.
VI. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we show the performance analysis of our scheme compared with schemes of [4] , [23] , [25] , [26] .
A. PERFORMANCE COMPARISON
We compare the secure properties and costs of our scheme with schemes of [4] , [23] , [25] , [26] . The properties of the public channel transmission, the secure trapdoor and the authenticated data owner are showed in Table 1 . According to the Table 1 , we can see that the schemes [23] , [25] , [26] do not supply the public channel transmission, the schemes [4] , [23] - [25] do not supply trapdoor indistinguishability as they have not random value in the trapdoor information, and the schemes [4] , [23] do not supply authentication of the data owner. However, our scheme supplies the above properties.
Then we analyze the main cost about ''encryption time, trapdoor generation time and test time'' reported in Table 2 . We denote that M is the symbol of point multiplication operation in G 1 , G is the symbol of exponent operation in G 1 , E is the symbol of pairing operation. We can ignore the other operation as they have little calculation. According to the Table 2 , we know that our scheme is a little less efficient than the schemes of [23] , [25] , [26] but efficient than scheme of [4] for encryption. For trapdoor generation process our scheme is less efficient than the schemes of [4] , [23] but more efficient than scheme of [25] , [26] . Since our scheme adds the function of verifying the identity of data owner and data user and the CS should perform these verification, our scheme is less efficient than the scheme of [4] , [23] , [25] , [26] .
B. SIMULATION EXPERIMENT
We do the experiment on PBC library with an Intel I7-4710 CPU processor running at 2.60 GHz, 16GB of RAM. We choose the elliptic curve of type A and decide that the number of keywords is 1000, 2000, 3000, 4000, 5000, 6000, 7000, 8000, 9000, 10000 respectively. The experimental result is shown in Figure 3 , Figure 4 and Figure 5 . We can see from Figure 3 and Figure 4 that the computation cost of Encryption and Trapdoor approximates to a constant. That is mean that the time for a single keyword encryption or trapdoor generation is independent from the total number of keywords or trapdoors encrypted. As can be seen from Figure 5 , the computation cost ofTest is linear in the number of keyword ciphertext. Moreover, while the number of keyword ciphertext approaches to 10000, the time consumption is about 0.3 seconds.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we analyzed the security of Ma et al.'s scheme firstly. By constructing concrete attack, we demonstrated that Ma et al.'s scheme did not satisfies with the trapdoor indistinguishability. Then we propose a verifiable certificateless searchable encryption scheme for IIoT to enhance the security of Ma et al.'s scheme and strengthen the authentication capability. The new scheme not only can resist to two types adversaries, but also can increase the features to authenticate the identity of the data owner. Finally, we proved our scheme satisfies the security properties of ciphertext indistinguishability, trapdoor indistinguishability and unforgeability under the random oracle model. The weakness of new scheme is that there are more system parameters. Therefore, we should construct efficiently searchable encryption schemes in the future.
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